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Device-independent quantum cryptographic schemes aim to guarantee security to users based
only on the output statistics of any components used, and without the need to verify their internal
functionality. Since this would protect users against untrustworthy or incompetent manufacturers,
sabotage or device degradation, this idea has excited much interest, and many device-independent
schemes have been proposed. Here we identify a critical weakness of device-independent protocols
that rely on public communication between secure laboratories. Untrusted devices may record their
inputs and outputs and reveal information about them via publicly discussed outputs during later
runs. Reusing devices thus compromises the security of a protocol and risks leaking secret data.
Possible defences include securely destroying or isolating used devices. However, these are costly
and often impractical. We propose other more practical partial defences as well as a new protocol
structure for device-independent quantum key distribution that aims to achieve composable security
in the case of two parties using a small number of devices to repeatedly share keys with each another
(and no other party).
Quantum cryptography aims to exploit the properties
of quantum systems to ensure the security of various
tasks. The best known example is quantum key distri-
bution (QKD), which can enable two parties to share a
secret random string and thus exchange messages secure
against eavesdropping, and we mostly focus on this task
for concreteness. While all classical key distribution pro-
tocols rely for their security on assumed limitations on
an eavesdropper’s computational power, the advantage
of quantum key distribution protocols (e.g. [1, 2]) is that
they are provably secure against an arbitrarily powerful
eavesdropper, even in the presence of realistic levels of
losses and errors [3]. However, the security proofs require
that quantum devices function according to particular
specifications. Any deviation – which might arise from a
malicious or incompetent manufacturer, or through sab-
otage or degradation – can introduce exploitable security
flaws (see e.g. [4] for practical illustrations).
The possibility of quantum devices with deliberately
concealed flaws, introduced by an untrustworthy man-
ufacturer or saboteur, is particularly concerning, since
(i) it is easy to design quantum devices that appear to
be following a secure protocol but are actually completely
insecure1, and (ii) there is no general technique for iden-
tifying all possible security loopholes in standard quan-
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1 In BB84 [1], for example, a malicious state creation device could
be programmed to secretly send the basis used for the encoding
in an additional degree of freedom.
tum cryptography devices. This has led to much interest
in device-independent quantum protocols, which aim to
guarantee security on the fly by testing the device out-
puts [5–15]: no specification of their internal functional-
ity is required.
Known provably secure schemes for device-
independent quantum key distribution are inefficient,
as they require either independent isolated devices
for each entangled pair to ensure device-independent
security [6, 10–12, 16], or a large number of entangled
pairs to generate a short key [6, 16, 17]. Finding
an efficient secure device-independent quantum key
distribution scheme using two (or few) devices has
remained an open theoretical challenge. Nonetheless,
in the absence of tight theoretical bounds on the scope
for device-independent quantum cryptography, progress
to date has encouraged optimism (e.g. [18]) about the
prospects for device-independent QKD as a practical
technology, as well as for device-independent quantum
randomness expansion [13–15] and other applications of
device-independent quantum cryptography (e.g. [19]).
However, one key question has been generally ne-
glected in work to date on device-independent quantum
cryptography, namely what happens if and when devices
are reused. Specifically, are device-reusing protocols com-
posable – i.e. do individually secure protocols of this type
remain secure when combined? It is clear that reuse of
untrusted devices cannot be universally composable, i.e.
such devices cannot be securely reused for completely
general purposes (in particular, if they have memory,
they must be kept secure after the protocol). However,
for device-independent quantum cryptography to have
significant practical value, one would hope that devices
2can at least be reused for the same purpose. For ex-
ample one would like to be able to implement a QKD
protocol many times, perhaps with different parties each
time, with a guarantee that all the generated keys can
be securely used in an arbitrary environment so long as
the devices are kept secure. We focus on this type of
composability here.
We describe a new type of attack that highlights pit-
falls in producing protocols that are composable (in
the above sense) with device-independent security for
reusable devices, and show that for all known protocols
such composability fails in the strong sense that purport-
edly secret data become completely insecure. The leaks
do not exploit new side channels (which proficient users
are assumed to block), but instead occur through the
device choosing its outputs as part of a later protocol.
To illustrate this, consider a device-independent
scheme that allows two users (Alice and Bob) to gen-
erate and share a purportedly secure cryptographic key.
A malicious manufacturer (Eve) can design devices so
that they record and store all their inputs and outputs.
A well designed device-independent protocol can prevent
the devices from leaking information about the generated
key during that protocol. However, when they are reused,
the devices can make their outputs in later runs depend
on the inputs and outputs of earlier runs, and, if the pro-
tocol requires Alice and Bob to publicly exchange at least
some information about these later outputs (as all exist-
ing protocols do), this can leak information about the
original key to Eve. Moreover, in many existing proto-
cols, such leaks can be surreptitiously hidden in the noise,
hence allowing the devices to operate indefinitely like hid-
den spies, apparently complying with security tests, and
producing only data in the form the protocols require,
but nonetheless actually eventually leaking all the pur-
portedly secure data.
We stress that our results certainly do not imply that
quantum key distribution per se is insecure or impracti-
cal. In particular, our attacks do not apply to standard
QKD protocols in which the devices’ properties are fully
trusted, nor if the devices are trusted to be memoryless
(but otherwise untrusted), nor necessarily to protocols
relying on some other type of partially trusted devices.
Our target is the possibility of (full) device-independent
quantum cryptographic security, applicable to users who
purchase devices from a potentially sophisticated adver-
sarial supplier and rely on no assumption about the de-
vices’ internal workings.
The attacks we present raise new issues of composabil-
ity and point towards the need for new protocol designs.
We discuss some countermeasures to our attacks that ap-
pear effective in the restricted but relevant scenario where
two users only ever use their devices for QKD exchanges
with one another, and propose a new type of protocol
that aims to achieve security in this scenario while al-
lowing device reuse. Even with these countermeasures,
however, we show that security of a key generated with
Bob can be compromised if Alice uses the same device for
key generation with an additional party. This appears to
be a generic problem against which we see no complete
defence.
Although we focus on device-independent QKD for
most of this work, our attacks also apply to other device-
independent quantum cryptographic tasks. The case of
randomness expansion is detailed in Appendix E.
Cryptographic scenario.—We use the standard crypto-
graphic scenario for key distribution between Alice and
Bob, each of whom has a secure laboratory. These labo-
ratories may be partitioned into secure sub-laboratories,
and we assume Alice and Bob can prevent communica-
tion between their sub-laboratories as well as between
their labs and the outside world, except as authorized by
the protocol. The setup of these laboratories is as follows.
Each party has a trusted private random string, a trusted
classical computer and access to two channels connecting
them. The first channel is an insecure quantum channel.
Any data sent down this can be intercepted and modi-
fied by Eve, who is assumed to know the protocol. The
second is an authenticated classical channel which Eve
can listen to but cannot impersonate; in efficient QKD
protocols this is typically implemented by using some
key bits to authenticate communications over a public
channel. Each party also uses a sub-laboratory to isolate
each of the untrusted devices being used for today’s pro-
tocol. They can connect them to the insecure quantum
channel, as desired, and this connection can be closed
thereafter. They can also interact with each device clas-
sically, supplying inputs (chosen using the trusted private
string) and receiving outputs, without any other informa-
tion flowing into or out of the secure sub-laboratory.
As mentioned before, existing device-independent
QKD protocols that have been proven unconditionally
secure [6, 11, 12] require separate devices for each mea-
surement performed by Alice and Bob with no possibility
of signalling between these devices2, or are inefficient [17]
(in terms of the amount of key per entangled pair). For
practical device-independent QKD, we would like to re-
move both of these disadvantages and have an efficient
scheme needing a small number of devices.
Since the protocols in [11, 12] can tolerate reasonable
levels of noise and are reasonably efficient, we look first
at implementations of protocols taking the form of those
in [11, 12], except that Alice and Bob use one measure-
ment device each, i.e., Alice (Bob) uses the same de-
vice to perform each of her (his) measurements. We call
these two-device protocols (Bob also has a separate iso-
lated source device: see below). The memory of a device
can then act as a signal from earlier to later measure-
ments, hence the security proofs of [11, 12] do not apply
(see also [20] where a different two-device setup is dis-
2 Within the scenario described above, this could be achieved by
placing each device in its own sub-laboratory.
31. Entangled quantum states used in the protocol are gen-
erated by a device Bob holds (which is separate and
kept isolated from his measurement device) and then
shared over an insecure quantum channel with Alice’s
device. Bob feeds his half of each state to his measure-
ment device. Once the states are received, the quantum
channel is closed.
2. Alice and Bob each pick a random input Ai and Bi to
their device, ensuring they receive an output bit (Xi
and Yi respectively) before making the next input (so
that the i-th output cannot depend on future inputs).
They repeat this M times.
3. Either Alice or Bob (or both) publicly announces their
measurement choices, and the relevant party checks
that they had a sufficient number of suitable input com-
binations for the protocol. If not, they abort.
4. (Sifting.) Some output pairs may be discarded accord-
ing to some public protocol.
5. (Parameter estimation.) Alice randomly and indepen-
dently decides whether to announce each remaining bit
to Bob, doing so with probability µ (where Mµ ≫ 1).
Bob uses the communicated bits and his corresponding
outputs to compute some test function, and aborts if it
lies outside a desired range. (For example, Bob might
compute the CHSH value [21] of the announced data,
and abort if it is below 2.5.)
6. (Error correction.) Alice and Bob perform error cor-
rection using public discussion, in order to (with high
probability) generate identical strings. Eve learns the
error correction function Alice applies to her string.
7. (Privacy amplification.) Alice and Bob publicly per-
form privacy amplification [22], producing a shorter
shared string about which Eve has virtually no infor-
mation. Eve similarly learns the privacy amplification
function they apply to their error-corrected strings.
TABLE I: Generic structure of the protocols we con-
sider. Although this structure is potentially restrictive, most
protocols to date are of this form (we discuss modifications
later). Note that we do not need to specify the precise sub-
protocols used for error correction or privacy amplification.
For an additional remark, see Part I of the Appendix
cussed). It is an open question whether a secure key can
be efficiently generated by a protocol of this type in this
scenario. Here we demonstrate that, even if a key can be
securely generated, repeat implementations of the proto-
col using the same devices can render an earlier generated
key insecure.
Attacks on two-device protocols.—Consider a QKD pro-
tocol with the standard structure shown in Table I. We
imagine a scenario in which a protocol of this type is
run on day 1, generating a secure key for Alice and Bob,
while informing Eve of the functions used by Alice for er-
ror correction and privacy amplification (for simplicity we
assume the protocol has no sifting procedure (Step 4)).
The protocol is then rerun on day 2, to generate a second
key, using the same devices. Eve can instruct the devices
to proceed as follows. On day 1, they follow the protocol
honestly. However, they keep hidden records of all the
raw bits they generate during the protocol. At the end
of day 1, Eve knows the error correction and privacy am-
plification functions used by Alice and Bob to generate
the secure key.
On day 2, since Eve has access to the insecure quan-
tum channel over which the new quantum states are dis-
tributed, she can surreptitiously modulate these quan-
tum states to carry new classical instructions to the de-
vice in Alice’s lab, for example using additional degrees of
freedom in the states. These instructions tell the device
the error correction and privacy amplification functions
used on day 1, allowing it to compute the secret key gen-
erated on day 1. They also tell the device to deviate
from the honest protocol for randomly selected inputs,
by producing as outputs specified bits from this secret
key. (For example, “for input 17, give day 1’s key bit 5
as output”.) If any of these selected outputs are among
those announced in Step 5, Eve learns the corresponding
bits of day 1’s secret key. We call this type of attack, in
which Eve attempts to gain information from the classical
messages sent in Step 5, a parameter estimation attack.
If she follows this cheating strategy for Nµ−1 < M in-
put bits, Eve is likely to learn roughly N bits of day 1’s
secret key. Moreover, only the roughly N output pairs
from this set that are publicly compared give Alice and
Bob statistical information about Eve’s cheating. Alice
and Bob cannot a priori identify these cheating output
pairs among the ≈ µM they compare. Thus, if the tolera-
ble noise level is comparable toNµ−1M−1, Eve can (with
high probability) mask her cheating as noise. (Note that
in unconditional security proofs it is generally assumed
that eavesdropping is the cause of all noise. Even if in
practice Eve cannot reduce the noise to zero, she can
supply less noisy components than she claims and use
the extra tolerable noise to cheat).
In addition, Alice and Bob’s devices each separately
have the power to cause the protocol to abort on any
day of their choice. Thus – if she is willing to wait long
enough – Eve can program them to communicate some
or all information about their day 1 key, for instance
by encoding the relevant bits as a binary integer N =
b1 . . . bm and choosing to abort on day (N +2)
3. We call
this type of attack an abort attack. Note that it cannot
be detected until it is too late.
As mentioned above, some well known protocols use
many independent and isolated measurement devices.
These protocols are also vulnerable to memory attacks,
as explained in Appendix D.
3 In practice, Eve might infer a day (N+2) abort from the fact that
Alice and Bob have no secret key available on day (N+2), which
in many scenarios might detectably affect their behaviour then
or subsequently. Note too that she might alternatively program
the devices to abort on every day from (N + 2) onwards if this
made N more easily inferable in practice.
4Modified protocols.—We now discuss ways in which these
attacks can be partly defended against.
Countermeasure 1.—All quantum data and all public
communication of output data in the protocol come from
one party, say Bob. Thus, the entangled states used in
the protocol are generated by a separate isolated device
held by Bob (as in the protocol in Table 1) and Bob
(rather than Alice) sends selected output data over a
public channel in Step 5. If Bob’s device is forever kept
isolated from incoming communication, Eve has no way
of sending it instructions to calculate and leak secret key
bits from day 1 (or any later day).
Existing protocols modified in this way are still inse-
cure if reused, however. For example, in a modified pa-
rameter estimation attack, Eve can pre-program Bob’s
device to leak raw key data from day 1 via output data
on subsequent days, at a low enough rate (compared to
the background noise level) that this cheating is unlikely
to be detected. If the actual noise level is lower than the
level tolerated in the protocol, and Eve knows both (a
possibility Alice and Bob must allow for), she can thereby
eventually obtain all Bob’s raw key data from day 1, and
hence the secret key.
In addition, Eve can still communicate with Alice’s
device, and Alice needs to be able to make some public
communication to Bob, if only to abort the protocol. Eve
can thus obtain secret key bits from day 1 on a later day
using an abort attack.
Countermeasure 2. [23]—Encrypt the parameter estima-
tion information sent in Step 5 with some initial pre-
shared seed randomness. Provided the seed required
is small compared to the size of final string generated
(which is the case in efficient QKD protocols [11, 12]),
the protocol then performs key expansion4. Furthermore,
even if they have insufficient initial shared key to en-
crypt the parameter estimation information, Alice and
Bob could communicate the parameter estimation infor-
mation unencrypted on day 1, but encrypt it on subse-
quent days using generated key.
Note that this countermeasure is not effective against
abort attacks, which can now be used to convey all or
part of their day 1 raw key. This type of attack seems
unavoidable in any standard cryptographic model requir-
ing composability and allowing arbitrarily many device
reuses if either Alice or Bob has only a single measure-
ment device.
This countermeasure is also not effective in gen-
eral cryptographic environments involving communica-
tion with multiple users who may not all be trustwor-
thy. Suppose that Alice wants to share key with Bob on
day 1, but with Charlie on day 2. If Charlie becomes
corrupted by Eve, then, for example by hiding data in
4 QKD is often referred to as quantum key expansion in any case,
taking into account that a common method of authenticating the
classical channel uses pre-shared randomness.
the parameter estimation, Eve can learn about day 1’s
key (we call this an impostor attack). This attack ap-
plies in many scenarios in which users might wish to use
device-independent QKD. For example, suppose Alice is
a merchant and Bob is a customer who needs to com-
municate his credit card number to Alice via QKD to
complete the sale. The next day, Eve can pose as a cus-
tomer, carry out her own QKD exchange with Alice, and
extract information about Bob’s card number without
being detected.
Countermeasure 3.—Alternative protocols using addi-
tional measurement devices. Suppose Alice and Bob
each havem measurement devices, for some small integer
m ≥ 2. They perform Steps 1–6 of a protocol that takes
the form given in Table I but with Countermeasures 1
and 2 applied. They repeat these steps for each of their
devices in turn, ensuring no communication between any
of them (i.e., they place each in its own sub-laboratory).
This yields m error-corrected strings. Alice and Bob con-
catenate their strings before performing privacy amplifi-
cation as in Step 7. However, they further shorten the
final string such that it would (with near certainty) re-
main secure if one of the m error-corrected strings were
to become known to Eve through an abort attack. (See
Table 2, and Appendix C for more details).
This countermeasure doesn’t avoid impostor attacks.
Instead, the idea is to prevent useful abort attacks (as
well as parameter estimation attacks due to Counter-
measure 2), and hence give us a secure and composable
protocol, provided the keys produced on successive days
are always between the same two users. The information
each device has about day 1’s key is limited to the raw
key it produced. Thus, if each device is programmed to
abort on a particular day that encodes their day 1 raw
key, after an abort, Eve knows one of the devices’ raw
keys and has some information on the others (since she
can exclude certain possibilities based on the lack of abort
by those devices so far). After an abort, Alice and Bob
should cease to use any of their devices unless and until
such time that they no longer require that their keys re-
main secret. Intuitively, provided the set of m keys was
sufficiently shortened in the privacy amplification step,
Eve has essentially no information about the day 1 se-
cret key, which thus (we conjecture) remains secure.
Countermeasure 4.—Alice and Bob share a small initial
secret key and use part of it to choose the privacy am-
plification function in Step 7 of the protocol, which may
then never become known to Eve.
Even in this case, Eve can pre-program Bob’s measure-
ment device to leak raw data from day 1 on subsequent
days, either via a parameter estimation attack or via an
abort attack. While Eve cannot obtain bits of the se-
cret key so directly in this case, provided the protocol
is composed sufficiently many times, she can eventually
obtain all the raw key. This means that Alice and Bob’s
residual security ultimately derives only from the initial
shared secret key: their QKD protocol produces no extra
permanently secure data.
5In summary, we have shown how a malicious man-
ufacturer who wishes to mislead users or obtain data
from them can equip devices with a memory and use
it in programming them. The full scope of this threat
seems to have been overlooked in the literature on device-
independent quantum cryptography to date. A task is
potentially vulnerable to our attacks if it involves secret
data generated by devices and if Eve can learn some func-
tion of the device outputs in a subsequent protocol. Since
even causing a protocol to abort communicates some in-
formation to Eve, the class of tasks potentially affected is
large indeed. In particular, for one of the most important
applications, QKD, none of the protocols so far proposed
remain composably secure in the case that the devices
are supplied by a malicious adversary.
One can think of the problems our attacks raise as
a new issue of cryptographic composability. One way
of thinking of standard composability is that a secure
output from a protocol must still have all the proper-
ties of an ideal secure output when combined with other
outputs from the same or other protocols. The device-
independent key distribution protocols we have examined
fail this test because the reuse of devices can cause later
outputs to depend on earlier ones. In a sense, the un-
derlying problem is that the usage of devices is not com-
posably secure. This applies too, of course, for devices
used in different protocols: devices used for secure ran-
domness expansion cannot then securely be used for key
distribution without potentially compromising the gen-
erated randomness, for example.
It is worth reiterating that our attacks do not apply
against protocols where the devices are trusted to be
memoryless. Indeed, there are schemes that are com-
posably secure for memoryless devices [11, 12]. We also
stress that our attacks do not apply to all protocols for
device-independent quantum tasks related to cryptogra-
phy. For example, even devices with memories cannot
mimic nonlocal correlations in the absence of shared en-
tanglement [24, 25]. In addition, in applications that
require only short-lived secrets, devices may be reused
once such secrets are no longer required. Partially se-
cure device-independent protocols for bit commitment
and coin tossing [19], in which the committer supplies
devices to the recipient, are also immune from our at-
tacks, so long as the only data entering the devices come
from the committer.
Note too that, in practice the number of uses required
to apply the attacks may be very large, for example, in
the case of some of the abort attacks we described. One
can imagine a scenario in which Alice and Bob want to
carry out device-independent QKD no more than n times
for some fixed number n, each is confident in the other’s
trustworthiness throughout, the devices are used for no
other purpose and are destroyed after n rounds, and key
generation is suspended and the devices destroyed if a
single abort occurs. If the only relevant information con-
veyed to Eve is that an abort occurs on one of the n days,
she can only learn at most log n bits of information about
the raw key via an abort attack. Hence one idea is that,
using suitable additional privacy amplification, Alice and
Bob could produce a device-independent protocol using
two measurement devices that is provably secure when
restricted to no more than n bilateral uses. It would be
interesting to analyse this possibility, which, along with
the protocol presented in Table 2, leads us to hold out
the hope of useful security for fully device-independent
QKD, albeit in restricted scenarios.
We have also discussed some possible defences and
countermeasures against our attacks. A theoretically
simple one is to dispose of – i.e. securely destroy or isolate
– untrusted devices after a single use (see Appendix B).
While this would restore universal composability, it is
clearly costly and would severely limit the practicality
of device-independent quantum cryptography. Another
interesting possibility is to design protocols for compos-
able device-independent QKD guaranteed secure in more
restricted scenarios. However, the impostor attacks de-
scribed above appear to exclude the possibility of com-
posably secure device-independent QKD when the de-
vices are used to exchange key with several parties.
Many interesting questions remain open. Nonetheless,
the attacks we have described merit a serious reappraisal
of current protocol designs and, in our view, of the prac-
tical scope of universally composable quantum cryptog-
raphy using completely untrusted devices.
Added Remark: Since the first version of this paper,
there has been new work in this area that, in part, ex-
plores countermeasure 2 in more detail [26]. In addition,
two new works on device-independent QKD with only
two devices have appeared [27, 28]. Note that these do
not evade the attacks we present, but apply to the sce-
nario where used devices are discarded.
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Appendix A: Separation of sources and
measurement devices
We add here one important comment about the gen-
eral structure of the generic protocol given in Table 1 of
the main text. There it was crucial that in Step 1, in the
7case where Bob (rather than Eve) supplies the states, he
does so using a device that is isolated from his measure-
ment device. If, on the other hand, Bob had only a single
device that both supplies states and performs measure-
ments, then his device can hide information about day 1’s
raw key in the states he sends on day 2. (This can be
done using states of the form specified in the protocol,
masking the errors as noise as above. Alternatively, the
data could be encoded in the timings of the signals or in
quantum degrees of freedom not used in the protocol.)
Appendix B: Toxic device disposal
As noted in the main text, standard cryptographic
models postulate that the parties can create secure
laboratories, within which all operations are shielded
from eavesdropping. Device-independent quantum cryp-
tographic models also necessarily assume that devices
within these laboratories cannot signal to the outside
– otherwise security is clearly impossible. Multi-device
protocols assume that the laboratories can be divided
into effectively isolated sub-laboratories, and that de-
vices in separate sub-laboratories cannot communicate.
In other words, Alice and Bob must be able to build ar-
bitrary configurations of screening walls, which prevent
communication among Eve and any of her devices, and
allow only communications specified by Alice and Bob.
Given this, there is no problem in principle in defining
protocols which prescribe that devices must be perma-
nently isolated: the devices simply need to be left indef-
initely in a screened sub-laboratory. While this could be
detached from the main working laboratory, it must be
protected indefinitely: screening wall material and secure
space thus become consumed resources. And indeed in
some situations, it may be more efficient to isolate de-
vices, rather than securely destroy them, since devices
can be reused once the secrets they know have become
public by other means. For example, one may wish to
securely communicate the result of an election before an-
nouncing it, but once it is public, the devices used for
this secure communication could be safely reused.
The alternative, securely destroying devices and then
eliminating them from the laboratory, preserves labora-
tory space but raises new security issues: consider, for ex-
ample, the problems in disposing of a device programmed
to change its chemical composition depending on its out-
put bit.
That said, no doubt there are pretty secure ways of
destroying devices, and no doubt devices could be se-
curely isolated for long periods. However, the costs and
problems involved, together with the costs of renewing
devices, make us query whether these are really viable
paths for practical device-independent quantum cryptog-
raphy.
Appendix C: Privacy Amplification
Here we briefly outline the important features of pri-
vacy amplification, which is a key step in the protocol. As
explained in the main text, the idea is to compress the
string such that (with high probability) an eavesdrop-
per’s knowledge is reduced to nearly zero. This usually
works as follows. Suppose Alice and Bob share some ran-
dom string, X , which may be correlated with a quantum
system, E, held by the eavesdropper. Alice also holds
some private randomness, R. The state held by Alice
and Eve then takes the form
ρXRE =
∑
x,r
PX(x)PR(r)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |r〉〈r|R ⊗ ρ
x
E ,
where {ρxE}x are normalized density operators, and
PR(r) = 1/|R|. The randomness R is used to choose
a function fR ∈ F , where F is some suitably chosen
set, to apply to X such that, even if she learns R, the
eavesdropper’s knowledge about the final string is close
to zero. If we call the final string S = fR(X), then Eve
has no knowledge about it if the final state takes the form
τS ⊗ ρRE , where τS is maximally mixed on S. However,
we cannot usually attain such a state, and instead mea-
sure the success of a protocol by its variation from this
ideal, measured using the trace distance, D. Denoting
the final state (after applying the function) by ρSRE , we
are interested in D(ρSRE , τS ⊗ ρRE).
Fortunately, several sets of function are known for
which the above distance can be made arbitrarily small.
Two common constructions are those based on two-
universal hash functions [3, 29–31] and Trevisan’s extrac-
tor [32, 33]. The precise details of these is not very impor-
tant for the present work (we refer the interested reader
to the references), nor is it important which we choose.
However, it is worth noting that for two-universal hash
functions, the size of the seed needs to be roughly equal
to that of the final string, while for Trevisan’s extrac-
tor, this can be reduced to roughly the logarithm of the
length of the initial string (in the latter case, this may
allow it to be sent privately, if desired).
For both, the amount that the string should be com-
pressed is quantified by the smooth conditional min-
entropy, which we now define. For a state ρAB, the non-
smooth conditional min-entropy is defined as
Hmin(A|B)ρ := max
σB
sup{λ ∈ R : 2−λ1A ⊗ σB ≥ ρAB},
in terms of which the smooth min entropy is given by
Hεmin(A|B)ρ := maxρ¯AB
Hmin(A|B)ρ¯.
The maximization over ρ¯ is over a set of states that are
close to ρAB according to some distance measure (see,
for example, [34] for a discussion).
The significance for privacy amplification can be seen
as follows. In [3], it is shown that if f is chosen randomly
from a set of two-universal hash functions, and applied
81. Entangled quantum states used in the protocol are gen-
erated by a device Bob holds (which is separate and
kept isolated from his measurement devices) and then
shared over an insecure quantum channel with Alice’s
first device. Bob feeds his half of each state to his first
measurement device. Once the states are received, the
quantum channel is closed.
2. Alice and Bob each pick a random input Ai and Bi
to their first device, ensuring they receive an output
bit (Xi and Yi respectively) before making the next
input (so that the i-th output cannot depend on future
inputs). They repeat this M times.
3. Bob publicly announces his measurement choices, and
Alice checks that for a sufficient number of suitable in-
put combinations for the protocol. If not, Alice aborts.
4. (Sifting.) Some output pairs may be discarded accord-
ing to some protocol.
5. (Parameter estimation.) Alice and Bob use their pre-
shared key to randomly select some output pairs (they
select only a small fraction, hence the amount of key
required for this is small). For each of the selected
pairs, Bob encrypts his output and sends it to Alice.
Alice uses the communicated bits and her correspond-
ing outputs to compute some test function, and aborts
if it lies outside a desired range.
6. (Error correction.) Alice and Bob perform error cor-
rection using public discussion, in order to (with high
probability) generate identical strings. Eve learns the
error correction function Alice applies to her string.
7. Alice and Bob repeat Steps 1–6 for each of their
m devices (ensuring the devices cannot communicate
throughout)
8. (Privacy amplification.) Alice and Bob concatenate
their m strings and publicly perform privacy ampli-
fication [22], producing a shorter shared string about
which Eve has virtually no information. In this step,
the size of their final string is chosen such that (with
high probability) it will remain secure even if one of
the raw strings or its error corrected version becomes
known.
TABLE 2: Structure of the protocol from the main
text with modifications as in Countermeasure 3. For
this protocol Alice and Bob each have m ≥ 2 measurement
devices, and Bob has one device for creating states. They are
all kept isolated from one another.
to the raw string X , as above, then for |S| = 2t and any
ε ≥ 0,
D(ρSRE , τS ⊗ ρRE) ≤ ε+
1
2
2−
1
2
(Hε
min
(X|E)−t).
(An analogous statement can be made for Trevisan’s ex-
tractor [33].) Thus, if Alice compresses her string to
length t = Hεmin(X |E)− ℓ, then the final state after ap-
plying the hash function has distance ε + 122
−ℓ/2 to a
state about which Eve has no knowledge.
Turning to the QKD protocol in Table 1 of the main
text, in the case of hashing the privacy amplification pro-
cedure consists of Alice selecting t depending on the test
function computed in the parameter estimation step. She
then uses local randomness to choose a hash function to
apply to her string, and announces this to Bob, who ap-
plies the same function to his string (since we have al-
ready performed error correction, this string should be
identical to Alice’s). The idea is that, if t is chosen ap-
propriately, it is virtually impossible that the parameter
estimation tests pass and the final state at the end of
the protocol is not close to one for which Eve has no
knowledge about the final string.
In the modified protocol in Table 2, we expect each
pair of devices to contribute roughly the same amount of
smooth min entropy to the concatenated string. Thus,
since there are m devices, in order to tolerate the po-
tential revelation of one of the error-corrected strings
through an abort attack, Alice should choose t to be
roughly (m− 1)/m shorter than she would otherwise.
Appendix D: Memory attacks on multi-device QKD
protocols
To illustrate further the generality of our attacks, we
now turn to multi-device protocols, and show how to
break iterated versions of two well known protocols.
Attacks on compositions of the BHK protocol
The Barrett-Hardy-Kent (BHK) protocol [6] requires
Alice and Bob to share MN2 pairs of systems (where
M and N are both large with M ≪ N), in such a
way that no measurements on any subset can effectively
signal to the others. In a device-independent scenario,
we can think of these as black box devices supplied by
Eve, containing states also supplied by Eve. Each de-
vice is isolated within its own sub-laboratory of Alice’s
and Bob’s, so that Alice and Bob have MN2 secure sub-
laboratories each. The devices accept integer inputs in
the range {0, . . . , N − 1} and produce integer outputs in
the range {0, 1}. Alice and Bob choose random indepen-
dent inputs, which they make public after obtaining all
the outputs. They also publicly compare all their outputs
except for those corresponding to one pair randomly cho-
sen from among those in which the inputs differ by ±1
or 0 modulo N . If the publicly declared outputs agree
with quantum statistics for specified measurement basis
choices (corresponding to the inputs) on a singlet state,
then they accept the protocol as secure, and take the
final undeclared outputs (which are almost certainly an-
ticorrelated) to define their shared secret bit.
The BHK protocol produces (with high probability)
precisely one secret bit: evidently, it is extremely inef-
ficient in terms of the number of devices required. It
also requires essentially noise-free channels and error-
free measurements. Despite these impracticalities it il-
9lustrates our theoretical point well. Suppose that Alice
and Bob successfully complete a run of the BHK protocol
and then (unauthorised by BHK) decide to use the same
2MN2 devices to generate a second secret bit, and ask
Eve to supply a second batch of states to allow them to
do this.
Eve — aware in advance that the devices may be
reused — can design them to function as follows. In
the first run of the protocol, she supplies a singlet pair
to each pair of devices and the devices function honestly,
carrying out the appropriate quantum measurements on
their singlets and reporting the outcomes as their out-
puts. However, they also store in memory their inputs
and outputs. In the second run, Eve supplies a fresh
batch of singlet pairs. However, she also supplies a hid-
den classical signal identifying the particular pair of de-
vices that generated the first secret bit. (This signal need
go to just one of this pair of devices, and no others.) On
the second run, the identified device produces as output
the same output that it produced on the first run (i.e. the
secret bit generated, up to a sign convention known to
Eve). All other devices function honestly on the second
run.
With probability MN
2−1
MN2 , the output from the cheating
device on the second run will be made public, thus reveal-
ing the first secret bit to Eve. Moreover, with probability
1 − 32N +O(N
−2), this cheating will not be detected by
Alice and Bob’s tests, so that Eve learns the first secret
bit without her cheating even being noticed.
There are defences against this specific attack. First,
the BHK protocol [6] can be modified so that only out-
puts corresponding to inputs differing by ±1 or 0 are
publicly shared.5 While this causes Eve to wait many
rounds for the secret bit to be leaked, and increases the
risk her cheating will be detected, it leaves the iterated
protocol insecure. Second, Alice and Bob could securely
destroy or isolate the devices producing the secret key
bit outputs, and reuse all their other devices in a second
implementation. Since only the devices generating the
secret key bit have information about it, this prevents it
from being later leaked. While effective, this last defence
really reflects the inefficiency of the BHK protocol: to il-
lustrate this, we turn next to a more efficient multi-device
protocol.
Attacks on compositions of the HR protocol
Ha¨nggi and Renner (HR) [11] consider a multi-device
QKD protocol related to the Ekert [2] protocol, in which
Alice and Bob randomly and independently choose one of
5 As originally presented, the BHK protocol requires public ex-
change of all outputs except those defining the secret key bit.
This is unnecessary, and makes iterated implementations much
more vulnerable to the attacks discussed here.
two or three inputs respectively for each of their devices.
If the devices are functioning honestly, these correspond
to measurements of a shared singlet in the bases U0, U1
(Alice) and V0, V1, V2 (Bob), defined by the following vec-
tors and their orthogonal complements
U1 ↔ |0〉 ,
V0 ↔ cos(π/8)|0〉+ sin(π/8)|1〉 ,
U0, V2 ↔ cos(π/4)|0〉+ sin(π/4)|1〉 ,
V1 ↔ cos(3π/8)|0〉+ sin(3π/8)|1〉 .
The raw key on any given run is defined by the ≈ 1/6
of the cases in which U0 and V2 are chosen. Information
reconciliation and privacy amplification proceed accord-
ing to protocols of the type described in the main text
(in which the functions used are released publicly).
Evidently, our attacks apply here too if (unauthorised
by HR) the devices are reused to generate further secret
keys. Eve can identify the devices that generate the raw
key on day 1, and request them to release their key as
cheating outputs on later days, gradually enough that the
cheating will be lost in the noise. Since the information
reconciliation and privacy amplification functions were
made public by Alice, she can then obtain the secret key.
Even if she is unable to communicate directly with the
devices for a long time (because they were pre-installed
with a very large reservoir of singlets), she can program
all devices to gradually release their day 1 outputs over
subsequent days, and so can still deduce the raw and
secret keys.
Alice and Bob could counter these attacks by securely
destroying or isolating all the devices that generated raw
key on day 1 — but this costs them 1/6 of their devices,
and they have to apply this strategy each time they gen-
erate a key, leaving (5/6)N of the devices after N runs,
and leaving them able to generate shorter and shorter
keys. As the length of secure key generated scales by
(5/6)N (or worse, allowing for fluctuations due to noise)
on each run, the total secret key generated is bounded
by ≈ 6M , where M is the secret key length generated on
day 1.
Note that, as in the case of the iterated BHK proto-
col, all devices that generate secret key become toxic and
cannot be reused. While the relative efficiency of the HR
protocol ensures a (much) faster secret key rate, it also
requires an equally fast device depletion rate. This ex-
ample shows that our attacks pose a generic problem for
device-independent QKD protocols of the types consid-
ered to date.
Appendix E: Device-independent randomness
expansion protocols: attacks and defences
Device-independent quantum randomness expansion
(DVI QRE) protocols were introduced by two of us [13,
15], developed further by [14, 35–37], and there now ex-
ist schemes with unconditional security proofs [36]. The
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cryptographic scenario here is slightly different from that
of key distribution in that there is only one honest party,
Alice.
Alice’s aim is to expand an initial secret random string
to a longer one that is guaranteed secret from an eaves-
dropper, Eve, even if the quantum devices and states
used are supplied by Eve. The essential idea is that seed
randomness can be used to carry out nonlocality tests on
the devices and states, within one or more secure labora-
tories, in a way that guarantees (with numerical bounds)
that the outcomes generate a partially secret and ran-
dom string. Privacy amplification can then be used to
generate an essentially fully secret random string, which
(provided the tests are passed) is significantly longer than
the initial seed.
There are already known pitfalls in designing such pro-
tocols. For example, although one might think that car-
rying out a protocol in a single secure laboratory guaran-
tees that the initially secure seed string remains secure,
and so guarantees randomness expansion if any new se-
cret random data is generated, this is not the case [15].
Eve’s devices may be programmed to produce outputs de-
pending on the random seed in such a way that the length
of the final secret random string depends on the initial
seed. Protocols with this vulnerability are not compos-
ably secure. (To see this can be a practical problem, note
that Eve may infer the length of the generated secret ran-
dom string from its use.)
A corollary of our results is that, if one wants to reuse
the devices to generate further randomness, it is crucial
to carry out DVI QRE protocols with devices perma-
nently held within a single secure laboratory, avoiding
any public communication of device output data at any
stage. It is crucial too that the devices themselves are se-
curely isolated from classical communications and com-
putations within the laboratory, to prevent them from
learning details of the reconciliation and privacy amplifi-
cation.
Even under these stringent conditions, our attacks still
apply in principle. For example, consider a noise-tolerant
protocol that produces a secret random output string of
variable length, depending on the values of test functions
of the device outputs (the analogue of QKD parameter
estimation for QRE) that measure how far the device
outputs deviate from ideal honest outputs. This might
seem natural for any single run, since – if the devices are
never reused – the length of the provably secret random
string that can be generated does indeed depend on the
value of a suitable test function. However, iterating such
a protocol allows the devices to leak information about
(at least) their raw outputs on the first run by generating
artificial noise in later rounds, with the level of extra
noise chosen to depend suitably on the output values.
Such noise statistically affects the length of the output
random strings on later rounds.
In this way, suitably programmed devices could ulti-
mately allow Eve to infer all the raw outputs from the
first round, given observation of the key string lengths
created in later rounds. This makes the round one QRE
insecure, since given the raw outputs for round one, and
knowing the protocol, Eve knows all information about
the output random string for round one, except that de-
termined by the secret random seed.
One defence against this would be to fix a length L for
the random string generated corresponding to a maxi-
mum acceptable noise level, and then to employ the Pro-
crustean tactic of always reducing the string generated
to length L, regardless of the measured noise level.
Even then, though, unless some restriction is placed on
the number of uses, the abort attack on QKD protocols
described in the main text also applies here. The devices
have the power to cause the protocol to abort on any
round of their choice, and so – if she is willing to wait
long enough – Eve can program them to communicate
any or all information about their round 1 raw outputs
by choosing the round on which they cause an abort.
We also described in the main text a moderately costly
but apparently effective defence against abort attacks
on QKD protocols, in which Alice and Bob each have
several isolated devices that independently generate raw
sub-keys, which are concatenated and privacy ampli-
fied so that exposing a single sub-key does not signifi-
cantly compromise the final secret key. This defence ap-
pears equally effective against abort attacks on device-
independent quantum randomness expansion protocols.
Since quantum randomness expansion generally involves
only a single party, these protocols are not vulnerable to
the impostor attacks described in the main text. It thus
appears that it may be possible in principle to completely
defend them against memory attacks, albeit at some cost.
It is also worth noting that there are many scenar-
ios in which one only needs short-lived randomness, for
example, in many gambling applications, bets are often
placed about random data that are later made public.
In such scenarios, once such random data have been re-
vealed, the devices could be reused without our attacks
presenting any problem.
